I
n the early decades of the 20th century, most Americans considered cosmetic surgery to be just a few steps removed from quackery. Many observers saw the desire for cosmetic surgery as a mark of vanity, and physicians tended to believe that such surgery violated their ethical injunction to do no harm. Yet by the end of the century, cosmetic surgery had become a multibillion-dollar business, and it is now an accepted part of mainstream medicine, with its own professional journals and associations. Cosmetic-surgery clinics are sponsored by elite academic centers such as Stanford, Johns Hopkins, and the Mayo Clinic. Even some feminists embrace cosmetic surgery as a tool for self-fulfillment. What happened to produce such a dramatic change?
One relevant development may have been the rise of academic psychology and its acceptance by consumer culture. By midcentury, at least some Americans had been persuaded that cosmetic surgery could be seen as a medical treatment for psychological problems such as the inferiority complex. According to this view, cosmetic surgery was not quackery or vanity or even merely cosmetic; as historian Elizabeth Haiken writes, it was "psychiatry with a scalpel." 1 This view lined up nicely with a more expansive, holistic conception of medicine itself. If a legitimate purpose of medicine is to improve a patient's psychological and social well-being, why not accomplish that purpose with surgery?
The transformation of "enhancements" into "treatments" is now a familiar part of medicine, of course, and it has been accelerated by medicine's move into the consumer marketplace. Physicians today prescribe drugs to lengthen attention spans, strengthen erections, and smooth out wrinkled brows, even when they are not entirely convinced that what they are treating is a medical need rather than a consumer desire. Many others write prescriptions for conditions that blur the boundary between pathology and ordinary human variability: synthetic growth hormone for idiopathic short stature, antidepressants for social anxiety disorder, and hormone-replacement therapy for the effects of menopause. The line between what consumers want and what patients need has become very hard to draw.
It may become even more difficult with the advent of genetic medicine, which, according to its advocates, promises us even greater control over our own constitutions. Not only will we be able to eliminate genetic disorders, claim the advocates, but we will produce genetically superior people. With the new "liberal eugenics," the genetic lottery will be replaced by a genetic supermarket, and genetic choices will be orchestrated not by an authoritarian state, but by providers and consumers. It sounds like science fiction, of course; and perhaps it is. But at least one U.S. infertility clinic currently allows parents to choose the sex of their child for "family balancing," and most clinics make a profit by allowing clients to choose donor sperm or oocytes on the basis of the donor's characteristics. And choice does not always mean improvement in any commonly accepted sense: a few years ago, a deaf couple fulfilled their desire to have a deaf child by seeking out a sperm donor with five generations of deafness in his family. Could such cases represent a glimpse into our genetic future?
Many of us feel uneasy about such a future, without being quite able to say why. Michael Sandel's graceful and intelligent new book, The Case against Perfection, is an extended effort to diagnose that unease. What troubles Sandel is not so much the particular kinds of traits and abilities that consumers might choose (deafness rather than super-hearing, for example) or even the possibility that these procedures will be bought and sold in the marketplace. It is the fact of choice itself. Sandel worries that more genetic choice will undermine our appreciation of the gifted character of human lifeour sense that the way we are is not solely the product of our own doing. For Sandel, the effort to bring our genetic constitution under our voluntary control represents a kind of hubris. Standing face to face with a marvel of biology, one produced by eons of natural selection, we decide we can do better.
Many Americans see choice as an unalloyed good: the more we have, the better off we are. But as Sandel points out, choice is a mixed blessing. The more control we exercise over our identities, the greater our responsibility for the results. Flaws we could once blame on nature, fate, or God, we may soon be able to blame only on ourselves (or perhaps on our parents). The converse is true as well: more genetic control may encourage the fortunate to see their talents as achievements they have earned, rather than gifts for which they should be grateful. In this way, Sandel suggests, genetic control may undermine the fragile sense of solidarity between the fortunate and the unfortunate. He writes, "A lively sense of the contingency of our gifts -an awareness that none of us is wholly responsible for his or her success -saves a meritocratic society from the smug assumption that success is the crown of virtue, that the rich are rich because they are more deserving than the poor."
Yet Sandel is also expressing a subtler worry. Most ethicists and legal scholars treat "enhancement technologies" as matters of individual liberty, and the basic question they ask is whether the technologies ought to be banned or regulated. Since the evidence for harm to others is usually vague and speculative, these writers often come out in favor of enhancement. Sandel's concerns belong to a different philosophical tradition, 2 one that is concerned less about what we will do with technology than about what technology will do to us. Here the question is still an ethical one, but it is not fundamentally a question about liberty and its limits or the banning or regulating of these technologies. It is an ethical question about human attitudes and desires. Which attitudes do we want to endorse, and which should we discourage? How will technology change them? Which desires are legitimate constituents of a good life, and which are symptoms of some deeper pathology?
For many philosophers in this tradition, the worry about enhancement is not that it is harmful or wrong but that the stance of mastery and control that it represents leaves insufficient cultural space for alternative ways of living a human life. Not that anyone would want to encourage absolute passivity, especially in the face of misfortune. But just as we worry about dominating parents who single-mindedly bend a child's life to their own will rather than remaining open to the child's particular character and talents, we might worry about an attitude toward life that strives exclusively for competition, mastery, and control, rather than for a receptivity toward the rolls and turns that life inevitably takes. This life might be one whose values lie closer to the aesthetic of the surfer than that of the speedboat racer, to that of the hitchhiker rather than the train driver, to the beauty of the oldgrowth forest rather than that of the golf course. As the philosopher James Edwards puts it, "It would be a life that conceives itself less as the creation of something hard and enduring and more as the increasingly plastic and receptive medium in which things leave their marks and traces." 3
Yet the title of The Case against Perfection is a little misleading. I suspect the motivation behind many so-called enhancement technologies is not really perfection. It is not even getting ahead. It is the fear of falling behind. The most popular enhancement drugs and procedures are aimed at people who feel they are too short or too fat or too shy, who are troubled by sexual inadequacy or social embarrassment, whose appearance or identity simply does not match up to conventional expectations. And if a physician is faced with a suffering patient who can be helped by a prescription or procedure, it is only natural to feel the urge to help, even if what is being fixed is not, strictly speaking, an illness.
But those prescriptions and procedures have a cost. Ethicists make a distinction between "enhancement" and "treatment," but many medical interventions look like neither. Instead, the ethical trade-off is between the good of the individual and that of the collective. We prescribe stimulants to help a struggling child compete at school, yet we worry about our hypercompetitive society; we give patients psychoactive drugs to relieve their emptiness and social alienation, yet we worry about a culture in which alienation seems endemic; we perform surgical procedures to make Asian eyes look European, yet we worry about the subtle racism that produces the surgical demand. We can produce individual well-being, it is true. But we do it at the expense of the larger social good. 
